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By the end of 1990s many cities in the United States had experience with 
competitive local telephony. In many locales Competitive Local Exchange Carriers 
(CLECs) entered into competition with each other and with the Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carrier (ILEC). In 1999, CLECs accounted for over $20 billion in annual 
revenue (New Paradigm Resources Group 2000). Despite their considerable size and 
their comparative novelty, only a few economics studies have analyzed the competitive 
behavior of these firms.
  
In this paper we consider the extent to which incentives to offer differentiated 
services affected the entry strategies of CLECs.  We reject the null hypothesis that entry 
behavior is unrelated to the types of services offered by firms (i.e., we reject 
homogeneous competitors). Although regulators and market participants suspected that 
opportunities for product differentiation could arise, previous analyses have not measured 
differentiation explicitly nor considered its importance in market development.  We 
argue, however, that it is central for understanding the economic and regulatory factors 
shaping competitive local telephony in this time period.  Our analysis also sheds light on 
the umbrella national policy for competitive telephony, as embodied in Federal 




We consider two alternative motivations for introducing competition into 
industries such as local telephony.  We label the first motivation scale-exceeding 
efficiencies.  It is the predominant framework used by standard analysis (Woroch 2001) 
and, as far as we know, motivates all empirical models of CLEC entry to date.
1 It frames 
                                                           
1 This literature preceded the 1996 Act. Woroch (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the literature 
with strong emphasis on scale-exceeding efficiencies. Another variant looks at price behavior, where these 
prices may (or may not) reflect the ability of new entrants to price underneath regulated (i.e., artificially) 
high prices to business customers (e.g., Rosston and Wimmer 2001). Another variant estimates a model of 
market share and assumes the ILEC is first mover in a Stackleberg game with CLECs (Abel 2002). 
Crandall's (2001) or Crandall and Sidek's (2002)analysis is more explicit about the role of differentiation. 
Yet, their models of empirical revenue only partly employ insights about differentiation. 
 
  1analysis in terms of the costs of providing similar services in either one or more 
organizations.  The CLEC’s prospects depend on its ability to lower costs — lower than 
an incumbent monopolist currently achieves—with its advantages of scale and/or scope 
economies. As in any standard model of price competition between otherwise 
homogeneous services, prices fall when entrants can achieve a level of efficiency 
exceeding that of the incumbent. 
An alternative motivation for competition is something we label customer-
targeted differentiation. This alternative is not reflected in existing empirical or most 
theoretical models.  According to industry analysts and participants, CLECs have the 
entrepreneurial ability to identify market opportunities otherwise unmet by the ILEC. 
These initiatives may reflect different visions about customer needs for service or the 
ability of entrants to offer innovative services without the obligations (e.g., universal 
service and reliability) imposed on ILECs by local regulators. It may also reflect the 
ability of a CLEC to offer a national product on a uniform basis, something expressly 
impossible for many ILECs to do at this time (Shiman and Rosenworcel 2002).  Price 
competition arises in the context of the willingness of customers to pay for the 
heterogeneous services. Competitive entry increases the variety available: CLECs do not 
pursue the same strategies, and their services are often not the same as those offered by 
the ILEC. 
Pointed disagreements between these alternative views account for sharp 
differences in policy recommendations and assessment. The scale-exceeding efficiencies 
view would emphasize only the number of firms that have entered, that is, policy is based 
on simple counts of competitors.  The customer-targeted differentiation view argues that 
models of homogenous consumers and mere counts of firms provide misleading 
implications about how entrants can differ and how and where consumers would value 
variety.  Therefore, a more appropriate checklist for measuring local competition would 
also incorporate the types of services offered by each of the CLECs.  While both views 
favor interconnection policies that give entrants a market test, the latter view also 
encourages CLEC strategies that differ from each other and those of the ILEC. 
 
  2I.ii Synopsis of Model, Data, and Results 
We build on the empirical literature that analyzes entry in concentrated markets 
and competition among differentiated firms.  As did Zolnierek, Eisner, and Burton 
(2001), we examine cross-sectional differences associated with the number of CLECs 
operating in an area. As in that study, we evaluate the impact of economic factors, such 
as demand and cost differences across markets, economies of geographic scope, and 
regulatory stringency. Unlike previous research, we tailor our estimation to small and 
medium-sized cities. We do this for three reasons. First, many large cities had already 
experienced competitive entry by the early 1990s, but it was new to medium- sized cities 
after the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Second, prior studies that used 
broader geographic market definitions provide potentially misleading insight about the 
extent of competition.
2   Third, this focus allows us to isolate the role of product 
differentiation, which is difficult to measure unambiguously in large cities. 
To focus the analysis on differentiated entrants, we employ an empirical 
framework found in Mazzeo’s (2002) study that evaluates market structure in terms of 
both the number of firms and the types of (potentially differentiated) products that firms 
offer.  Parameters in the model measure whether entrants behave as if competition from a 
similar type of firm is expected to hurt profits more than competition from one that is 
different. These parameters statistically test a null hypothesis of homogeneous 
competitors against an alternative that incorporates the differential impact of 
heterogeneous competitors. Applying this statistical test to the market for CLECs is the 
central contribution of our study. 
The econometric model requires finely grained data.  We employ a data set 
derived from the New Paradigm Resources Group (NPRG), which publishes an annual 
census on CLEC activity. The NPRG (2000) report tracks CLEC entry at the city level, 
which is the appropriate market definition, since CLECs often compete by block to-block 
in geographically focused areas.  The NPRG report also documents differences between 
                                                           
2 Zolneirek, Eisner, and Burton (2001) count the number of firms in each local area transport area (LATA), 
a wide geographic area that typically contains several cities large enough to support entry of individual 
CLECs.  Two CLECs operating in different cities within the same LATA would not be competitors in our 
data. Recent FCC reports count entrants at the zip code, but they do not differentiate between type of 
entrant (Federal Communications Commission, 2000, 2001). 
 
  3the strategies of the various CLECs.  This provides the data for studying the 
differentiation and competition hypothesis described above. The differences used in our 
study are simple to measure and use in policy evaluation, so we will place emphasis on 
demonstrating their feasibility and meaningfulness.  This demonstration is another 
contribution of our analysis. 
We use data from 1999, the last year of unambiguously optimistic growth 
prospects for CLECs.  By 1999 there was no question that most major cities could 
support some CLECs in addition to the ILEC. Yet, even by the end of the 1990s 
competition was not widespread in many small and medium-sized cities. Because 
competition arose in some of these cities and not in others, data from this year expose the  
factors that facilitate the advance of competition in local telephony.   
Our results are stark. We reject the null hypothesis of homogenous product 
competition. We also find that the motivation to provide heterogeneous services is 
comparable to other demographic and regulatory factors in terms of its contribution to 
observed market structure. We argue that these results support a change in the analysis 
and evaluation of competitive behavior and interconnection in local telephony, which 
elevates differentiation to a level of much greater importance. This framing also provides 
a number of new insights about the local demographic and regulatory factors making 
entry more or less attractive, details that we explore below. 
 
 
II. The Economics of CLEC Market Structure. 
An empirical analysis of CLEC entry that is motivated by scale-exceeding 
efficiencies has three basic elements:  (1) the size of local market demand, (2) the costs of 
entering and operating, including potential economies of scope across markets, and (3) 
how demand and costs (elements 1 and 2) interact with the regulatory setting.   A model 
of customer-targeted differentiation has those same elements, plus more. In this section, 
we describe the implications of each approach.  Because differentiation has not been 
addressed explicitly in prior empirical CLEC studies, we explain why it is an important 
consideration, while drawing connections with previous work (e.g., Crandall 2001, 
Crandall and Sidek 2001, Zolnierek, Eisner and Burton 2001, Abel 2002).  
  4 
II.i. Local Market Demand for Vertically Disintegrated Firms 
In traditional analyses, CLEC entry behavior is shaped by the presence of fixed 
costs in the provision of local telephone service.  Whether they build their own facilities 
or lease part of their network from the ILEC, CLECs incur costs to set up and maintain 
the infrastructure needed to offer services.  These fixed costs range from engineering 
costs to marketing expenses to costs associated with negotiating interconnection 
agreements.  While some of these expenses may vary with the long-term size of the 
revenue stream, every CLEC incurs substantial fixed costs associated with initiating a 
previously unknown firm and maintaining operations of an ongoing business. 
Zolnierek, Eisner and Burton (2001), following the spirit of the New Empirical 
Industrial Organization (NEIO) on entry (Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992)), 
hypothesize that the need to cover these fixed costs limits the number of entrants in 
individual markets. That is, because of the presence of fixed costs in each location where 
they provide services, CLECs require a sufficient level of variable profits — quantity of 
customers times operating margins —to cover their fixed expenses.  Cities vary most 
notably in their size, which affects the demand for CLEC services.  Operating margins 
may also be different across markets, particularly in cases where variable cost rates are 
established by local regulators.  The level of competition within markets may affect 
operating margins as well.  As a result of all of these differences, we expect the number 
of CLECs operating to vary across cities. 
Using our data set of CLECs in Table 1, we illustrate a key part of this logic..  
Among the 718 cities where CLECs have entered or made plans to enter,
3 over 400 have 
just one CLEC and over 600 have fewer than five; on the other hand only 55 cities have 
ten or more CLECs and only 18 have twenty or more.  As expected, cities with larger 
populations have the largest number of potential entrants. whereas smaller cities have the 
fewest.
4  We will augment our market size measures beyond residential population in the 
empirical analysis.     
                                                           
3 Including CLECs that are planning service in particular cities constitutes the most optimistic assessment 
of CLEC entry possible (we precisely define "planned" below).   
 
4 In Table 1 average population size is calculated over all the cities within a category,that is, it includes all 











20 +  18  New York, Dallas, Chicago, Atlanta  1,438,877 
10-19  38  Cleveland, St. Louis, Tucson, Norfolk  573,492 
5-10  54  Little Rock, Fresno, Madison, Omaha,  226,935 
3-4  77  Bakersfield, Reno, Gainesville, Waco  158,211 
2  91  Biloxi, Fargo, Kalamazoo, Naperville  84,260 
1  441  Bangor, Bismark, Champaign, Yonkers  43,640 
Total 718  ————  137,143 
 
  We also investigate differences across cities in the costs of providing CLEC 
services, including both fixed and operating costs.  One source of such differences may 
relate to economies of scope.  If two neighboring cities share economic infrastructure or 
have similar telecommunications demand, costs incurred by a CLEC entrant may be 
shared between the neighboring markets.  For example, medium-sized cities near large 
metropolitan areas may experience more entry than do similar markets located further 
from a major urban hub. 
  More direct differences in costs may result from the regulatory environments in 
which CLECs enter and operate.  Although the 1996 Telecommunications Act prescribed 
pro-competitive regulatory rules designed to foster market-oriented decision making for 
investment in local data and voice services, individual markets varied in how 
implementation of the rules affected local entrants.  For example, Mini (2001) carefully 
documents that CLECs had distinct experiences depending on whether they were 
interconnecting with (1) Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), (2) GTE 
(renamed Verizon after its merger), or (3) another independent telecommunications firm.
5  
To the extent that such differences create different entry costs for CLECs, a location may 
be more or less attractive to CLECs. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 cities with twenty or more entrants, all 38 with between ten and nineteen, and so on. 
 
5 RBOCs developed interconnection with entrants as part of a quid-pro-quo with the FCC, which sought to 
disallow entry into the long-distance market until RBOCs complied with a series of tests for opening their 
local markets (Shiman and Rosenwercel 2002). In contrast, the non-RBOC incumbents simply made deals 
under the guidance of their local state regulators. 
 
  6There is also considerable evidence of differences in the way state regulators 
enforced prescriptions in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which induced differences 
in costs across localities.  For example, policies for re-averaging prices between high 
business and low residential rates affected the attractiveness of providing services to 
business (Rosston and Wimmer 2001). Similarly, state agencies set varying wholesale 
prices within and across states that affected variable costs of interconnection (Gregg 
2002). Other state regulatory agencies made it easy or difficult to become a seller or 
value-added reseller of services related to DSL. We work with the hypothesis that a  state 
regulatory agency can make entry in particular cities more or less attractive for CLECs 
by affecting the fixed costs of entry as well as the variable costs of operating. 
 
II. ii Entry, Competition and Product Differentiation 
  The discussion above highlights a series of market conditions that potentially 
influence CLEC entry, either through market size or by raising or lowering costs.  If 
CLECs choose to enter by judging whether they expect variable profits to exceed entry 
costs, prices must come into play as well.  Standard models predict prices will be lower 
in markets with more competitors — this suggests that the market size (quantity) 
necessary to support additional CLECs will increase as the number of operating firms 
increases.  Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) find such a pattern between entry and market size 
in their study of several homogeneous service industries. 
  If CLECs follow a model of customer-targeted differentiation, however, the 
competitive effects of additional entry may be somewhat mitigated.  Prices will not fall as 
quickly with additional entry if CLECs offer differentiated products and if customers 
value the differences enough to pay more to the firm that more closely serves their 
particular needs.  As such, the success of these strategies depends on how much a 
consumer values variety. To be clear, we focuse on measuring firm behavior affiliated 
with providing variety and not on measuring user valuation of the variety once it is 
provided.




Build out  Facilities may be built out to enhance reliability; to ease servicing 
big clients in specific locales; or to customize service to specific 
users needs, such as large data transfers. 
Geographic 
coverage 
Scope of offerings may be tailored to multi-establishment users or to 
users in many different locations. 
Vision of services  Services are tailored to bring value from new technology of 
combination of services (e.g., Cable television, Internet, DSL). 
Service quality   The CLEC provides superior after-sale services or related services 
in network maintenance activities, such as single contracts for 
network emergencies or contracts for bundles of voice and nonvoice 
services. 
Non-price norms  The CLEC may employ receptionists who smile, repair people who 
hustle, and accounts receivable employees who quickly correct 
billing errors.  
 
In Table 1b, we provide examples of types of customer-targeted differentiation 
strategies commonly discussed in the trade press during the late 1990s (see NPRG 2000 
for a summary). To be sure, no matter how it is deployed, every CLEC offers telephone 
and related data carrier services. In spite of these fundamental commonalities, CLECs 
and industry analysts cite particular features of firms that produce value for certain end 
users.  The data in Table 1b suggest ways that CLEC services might be tailored to 
customer needs. 
We are not interested in evaluating the veracity of the detailed service claims 
made by any CLEC in any particular city. Our concern here is whether the firms’ entry 
behavior suggests that the asserted differences affect subsequent competition. The ability 
to successfully differentiate may increase the likelihood of CLEC entry, since a targeted 
firm would earn higher revenues serving the same number of customers.  As a result, two 
differentiated firms may be willing to enter a market that would not be attractive to two 
identical firms.  
The differentiation between business and residential customers illustrates this 
general principle. By 1999, the CLEC industry had expanded beyond solely voice into 
services affiliated with carrying data traffic. These latter services were potentially 
valuable to business customers, but of more limited value to residential customers. The 
  8CLECs could vary their portfolio of services to target these distinct sets of customers. To 
the extent that these chosen services generate higher willingness to pay from their 
targeted customers, the differentiated CLECs would earn higher revenues.  This in turn 
could affect market structure — there might be enough demand to support one CLEC 
aimed at business users and another aimed at residential users in a small city that could 
not support two identical CLECs that do not target a particular set of customers.   
  Product heterogeneity also opens questions about the asymmetric influence of 
demand, costs, and the regulatory setting on differentiated CLECs. For example, different 
components of total market size may provide demand to one type of CLEC over another.  
Depending on their preferences, regulatory agencies might pass rules that result in lower 
costs or better opportunities for some CLEC types.
6  
 
II.iii Inferences about Competition and Entry in a Period of Growing Demand 
We will infer the importance of differentiation from entry behavior that is 
consistent with it. To be sure, entry behavior is also sensitive to industry-wide 
perceptions about the current state of demand and expectations for the near future by 
contemporary actors.  A few years after the millennium it became apparent that some 
CLECs had been “optimistic.” More precisely, some CLECs did not realize revenues 
sufficient to cover the debts incurred in building their facilities and marketing their new 
services. The trade press dates the beginning of the decline of optimism at the spring of 
2000, when financial support for dot.coms collapsed. It reached a nadir in fall 2001, after 
the September 11 terrorist attack shook business confidence in long-term investments. 
This low continued as the WorldCom financial scandal became publicized in the spring 
of 2002. Consequently, some CLECs curtailed expansion plans they announced in 1999 
and previous years. Others left the market altogether.  
                                                           
6  Regulatory agencies could use the introduction of competition to undo cross-subsidies, thereby 
encouraging new entrants to price underneath regulated (i.e., artificially) high prices to business customers 
(e.g., Rosston and Wimmer 2001). Such a regulatory environment would comparatively favor CLECs with 
a business focus, but not necessarily those with a residential focus. As another example, the passage of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act altered the regulatory framework for dispute resolution between ILEC and 
CLEC, particularly by shifting responsibility for documenting ILEC competitive (mis)behavior to state 
regulators. It is an open question as to what firm this change comparatively favored — a local firm having 
business or political connections with the state regulator or national firms with larger in-house legal 
experience in regulatory proceedings. 
 
  9This plays a role in our analysis of 1999 in some ways and not in others.  We 
operate with the premise that expectations about demand growth beyond 1999 were 
optimistic, but only in retrospect were they too optimistic. We presume that 
contemporary actors made entry decisions on the basis of the best available information, 
and we ask whether their behavior is consistent with the importance of scale-exceeding 
efficiencies or customer-targeted differentiation. We acknowledge that deviations from a 
common perception about the anticipated growth of the level of demand could alter the 
number of CLECs a city can support. Conceivably, realized deviations from a common 
perception about the anticipated success of CLECs that pursue particular forms of 
differentiation could influence the CLEC types that survive in any market structure.  In 
the empirical work, we assume and condition on the presence of such common 
perceptions.  Note that, in particular, perceptions cannot be systematically different 
across areas of the country, since our identification strategy is based on cross-sectional 
differences in market structure.  Our framework will focus on measuring the incentive to 
differentiate from a rival in the same location, as perceived at the time. 
 
III. Data 
Our modeling approach uses three types of information:  
1.  We require cross-sectional information about CLEC entry. A census of CLEC 
firms operating in cities across the United States come from the 1999 CLEC 
Report, provided by NPRG (2000).  
2.  We also require cross-sectional information about the economic conditions at 
specific localities. Information about the economic conditions in cities comes 
from the most recent U.S. Census data.   
3.  Finally, we require cross-sectional information about the regulatory 
environment of specific localities.  Information about the regulatory 
environment comes from Abel and Clements’ (2001) study.  
 
III.i Sample Construction 
We analyze product differentiation and competition among CLECs by studying the 
structure of a cross-section of markets.  We attempt to distinguish between as many 
  10different local markets as we can, while taking care to define markets in such a way that 
the set of firms in the market all compete with each other (at least to some extent) and 
that no firms outside the defined market are competitors.   
For CLECs, the most appropriate geographic market definition is at the level of 
individual cities. Although jurisdictional boundaries for cities do not always correspond 
with economic market boundaries in many industries, cities best approximate markets for 
CLECs. The services CLECs provide are inherently locally focused — the firm must 
establish a presence in a city in order to connect customers or businesses residing there.  
This makes most small and medium-sized cities geographically distinct market areas, 
even when they are suburbs in large metropolitan areas.  We avoid the potential concern 
of distinct submarkets within cities because we do not include larger cities in our 
analysis.  This difficulty is most serious in places such as Los Angeles or New York 
City.
7  
Similarly, the total size of the sample involved some trade-offs. We constructed a 
sample of every city in the United States with at least one actual CLEC entrant as of 
1999, while dropping a few cities due to for incomplete information. We also wanted to 
include cities that are candidates for entry but that have not yet experienced it, because it 
helps identify the margin between any entry and none. For this purpose, we also included 
every city in the Untied States in which any CLEC expressed any announced plan to 
enter, even when these plans were several years in the future. This approach yielded over 
260 cities with no actual entrants as of 1999. Also, this provided us with a convenient 
stopping rule, since there is little statistical benefit from including each of the thousands 
of small isolated cities in the United States with little economic base for supporting 
CLEC entry.
8  
                                                           
7 Our data set reflects this issue directly; for example, some CLECs reported operating in "New York City" 
while others said they offered services in "Manhattan."  From these descriptions, it was impossible to 
discern whether the firms were competitors.  Cities with potentially overlapping submarkets were removed 
from the final data set. 
 
8 This does, however, preclude us from estimating a threshold between cities where entry is at least planned 
and those with no CLEC activity at all.  This threshold may also be of some policy interest, but is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 
  11In Table 2, we summarize the firm counts in the 718 cities where at least one CLEC 
was operating, or was planning to begin operations, as of 1999.  The number in each box 
in Table 2 indicates the number of cities that have the corresponding number of operating 
and planned CLECs.  Of the 718 cities, all but 260 had at least one firm operating as of 
1999.  A total of 261 cities had just one firm operating, with the numbers getting smaller 
through ten or more firms operating.  In the planned category, no new CLECs were 
planning to enter in 250 cities, while 316 had one planned entrant (most of these were 
among the 260 cities with no operating CLECs).  Again, the number of cities with 
CLECs in the planned category decreases rapidly across the table.  There is considerable 
planned entry in markets of all sizes; however, the markets with the largest number of 
operating firms also have the largest number of planned entrants.   
 
Table 2:  Histogram of Cities: Number of Operating and Planned CLECs in the Market 
 
 Planned 
Operating  0 1 2 3 4 5  6-9  10+  Total 
0  ––––  238  17  4 1 0 0 0  260 
1  203  38  14  5 0 0 0 0  261 
2  36  21  13  5 2 1 0 0  78 
3  6 9  12  4 2 0 2 0  35 
4  4 6 1 2 1 5 2 1  22 
5  1 1 1 1 2 0 4 1  11 
6-9  0 3 0 1 5 5  10  4  28 
10+  0 0 1 0 0 1  10  11  23 
Total  250  316  59 22 13 12 29 17  718 
 
 
III.iii Firm Characteristics and the Endogenous Variable 
We classify firms into discrete categories on the basis of their business strategies and 
product offerings.
9  First, CLECs vary in the geographic extent of their operations. Some 
                                                           
9 Those analysts who do acknowledge CLEC differentiation draw these distinctions similarly. Crandall and 
  12CLECs have ambitions to be providers of telecommunication services in cities across the 
country, whereas others focus on a more limited geographic region. Local firms may 
better respond to the needs of consumers in particular markets, while national CLECs 
may have scale economies in building reputation and can potentially offer consumers 
located in multiple cities a common telecommunications vendor.  The NPRG (2000) data 
lists the complete set of cities into which each CLEC has entered.  We labeled CLECs as 
"local/regional" if they operate completely within one city or a small number of 
contiguous states.  Those operating in cities from multiple regions of the country are 
labeled “national.”   
In Table 3, we present the breakdown between national CLECs and the local/regional 
firms in each of the individual markets in the data set (note that this table only includes 
the cities with at least one operating firm).  Here we see that the cities with fewer 
operating CLECs typically contain predominately local/regional firms — for example, 
among the markets with one firm operating, that firm is a local/regional CLEC in nearly 
80% of the cases.  As the total number of firms increases, however, there is a greater 
tendency for cities to be differentiated, with the same or close number of each type of 
firms as opposed to all or almost all of one type.  Nearly half of the two-CLEC markets 
have one local/regional firm and one national firm.  This general pattern holds in markets 
with 3 or 4 CLECs as well. Over all, this table strongly hints at the presence of 
differentiated entry. 
From the NPRG (2000) data, we also observe that individual CLECs 
differentiated themselves by tailoring their service offerings to appeal to particular 
groups of customers.  The most distinct division was between business and residential 
customers. Although every CLEC provided service to some business customers, we could 
distinguish between those that also targeted residential users and those that focused on 
business consumers only. Table 4 displays our markets for CLECs broken down between 
these two customer focus categories.   Again, we observe markets that are differentiated. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sidek (2001), for example, emphasize the differences between a focus on business and residential 
customers, as do we. Crandall (2001) also emphasizes the difference between building facilities and relying 
on rental of unbundled network elements; however, we were not able to obtain comprehensive data on 
these strategies and do not analyze them here. 
 
  13Of the  78 two-CLEC cities, 58 have one firm that targets its offerings to businesses and 
one firm that also serves residential customers.  These raw data strongly suggest some 
underlying pattern of entry in which differentiation is optimal — if the business-only and 
some-residential CLECs were equally likely to enter the market under all circumstances, 
we would expect as many as 52 of 78 markets to have exactly one firm of each type only 
0.1% of the time.  These patterns continue in markets with a larger total number of 
CLECs as well. 
 
Table 3:  Number of National and Local/Regional CLECs per City 
 National  CLECs 
Local/Regiona
l CLECs 
0 1 2 3  4+ 
0  N/A 69  5  3  1 
1  214 35  10  3  2 
2  38 11  9  3  1 
3  12 6  4  1  5 
4+  4 2 8 6 2 
 
 
Table 4:  Number of Business Only and Some Residential CLECs per City 













0  N/A 144  15  5  6 
1  139 52  21  8  7 
2  11 8  8  4  7 
3  2 2 1 2 4 
4+  1 1 1 3 3 
 
Before leaving our discussion of product differentiation and the definition of the 
dependent variable, we investigate the relationship between the two dimensions of 
  14heterogeneity.  In Table 5, we summarize the pair of characteristics for the individual 
CLECs operating in 1999.  We found no apparent correlation between the customer focus 
and the geographic scope of individual CLECs.  In other words, a national CLEC was as 
likely to maintain a business versus a residential focus as was a local/regional CLEC. 
Had we found a correlation, we would have tried to assess both aspects of product 




Table 5:  Number of Business Only and Some Residential CLECs   
 Business  only  Some 
residential 
Total 
Local/Regional  31 44 75 
National  16 13 29 
Total  47 57  104 
 
The tables in this section show how CLECs with different classifications sort themselves 
into markets of various sizes. The basic empirical fact in these tables portend our  main 
findings:  The CLECs acted as if differentiating their services provided additional 
profitability and facilitated entry into local markets in the late 1990s.  A pair of CLECs in 
the same market most likely was distinguished by differentiated service offerings. 
 
III.iii Economic Data about Localities 
Cities will differ in their ability to generate the necessary demand to make CLEC 
entry attractive.  To account for these differences, we collected demographic data from 
each city.  Market "size" was the most important of these characteristics — here, we are 
interested in both the resident population and measures of business activity, since CLEC 
services are often particularly valuable to business customers.  Population is each city's 
population and per capita income represents the average income of the city's residents.  
                                                           
10Even if we found a correlation, it is not clear that we even have sufficient data to identify 
complementarity or substitutability. Athey and Stern (1998) detail the strict data requirements necessary to 
identify complementarities in a cross-sectional study such as this.  Even if complementarities were assumed 
to be zero, a very large data set would be required in the case in which competing firms could choose 
among four potential options (one of each type from two categories) simultaneously. 
  15The variable payroll measures the annual payroll of workers employed in the city; as 
such it combines both the overall level of business activity and the wages earned by 
workers.
  Summary statistics for all of the explanatory variables are included in Table 6. 
 As described above, we hypothesize that CLECs are able to share costs (such as 
marketing, administration, and initial costs associated with interconnection) among 
nearby cities (even if separate facilities are built).  It is possible, therefore, that a small 
city within a larger Metropolitan statistical area (MSA) may be less expensive for a firm 
to serve than a more isolated city of equal size.  We include the dummy variable city in a 
top-10 MSA to represent those cities that are within the boundaries of one of the ten 
largest urban areas in the United States.  We confirm that the dummies were plausibly 
related to our proposed interpretation of scope economies by inspecting the CLECs that 
entered the city in a top-10 MSA.  Of the 381 CLEC observations in such cities, 333 of 
them also operated in the MSAs corresponding central city.
 11 
We also examine cost differences across markets that relate to the local regulatory 
environment. Abel and Clements’ (2001) study provides us with  a time-series of 
regulatory rules that states have used on ILECs under their jurisdiction.
12  For each 
state/ILEC combination, we counted the number of years (of the previous sixteen) that 
either a rate freeze or price cap had been imposed.  Our summary measure of regulatory 
stringency is a collapsed version of this year count — regulatory stringency equals 0 in 
areas where these alternatives had never been used, 1 if they had been tried for between 
one and four years, and 2 if a freeze or cap was in place for more than five years.  We 
hypothesize that a higher value of regulatory stringency indicates a regulatory 
environment that would be friendlier (i.e., be lower in cost) to an entering CLEC.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
11 We explored several other demographic variables as well.  Because  the facilities-based CLECs must 
make capital investments in equipment to link their customers, cities with more geographically 
concentrated residential neighborhoods and business centers may provide CLECs with customers that are 
less expensive to serve.   However, the density measures that we calculated (both residential and for 
businesses) did not provide additional explanatory power.  It may be that density differences affect where 
CLECs operate within cities but not entry decisions across cities.   
 
12 Regulators often have different rules for each incumbent carrier within its state. These rules apply to all 
the areas within that state where the particular incumbent operates.  Therefore, it was necessary to match 
each market to both its incumbent and its state regulator to determine the status of the incumbent 
competitor.   
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Table 6:  Explanatory Variables — Summary Statistics 
    
All Cities (n = 718) 
Small/Medium-Sized 













Population  City population  137,143  357,890  85,270  110,244 
Payroll  Annual payroll of city 
employees  
2,196,817 6,544,441 1,247,663 1,802,501 
Per Capita 
Income 
Per capita income of 
city residents 




Dummy Variable = 1 
if city within Top 10 
MSAs 
0.252 0.434  0.244  0.430 
Incumbent  
= RBOC 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
ILEC is an RBOC 




variable (described in 
text) 





set by state regulatory 
agency 
16.22 6.24  16.44  6.30 
 
Specific provisions in the 1996 Telecommunications Act require incumbents to 
provide interconnection access to CLEC competitors; however, RBOC firms that wanted 
to enter the market for long-distance services were precluded from doing so until 
regulators were satisfied that they had been sufficiently cooperative with CLECs 
attempting to interconnect and provide service in their local areas.  Incumbents that were 
not RBOCs did not have this incentive to facilitate CLEC entry.  Following on the results 
of Mini (2001), we included an RBOC dummy variable to control for the differing 
incumbent incentives across the markets in the data set. In addition, local regulators 
prescribed the costs that CLECs were required to pay ILECs for interconnection.  These 
rates vary by and within each state;  typically they were set lower in more densely 
populated areas.  Using data from Gregg’s (2002) and Rosston and Wimmer’s (2001) 
studies, we created the variable interconnection rate to capture the cross-sectional 
  17differences in interconnection costs for CLECs entering across cities in the data set.
13 
While entry costs for a CLEC depend on regulated rates for a variety of unbundled 
elements, most of these rates are correlated with each other in the cross section. Hence, 
one variable alone captures the biggest differences between locations.
14  
 
IV. Empirical Models of CLEC Entry  
The empirical modeling approach that we utilize fits into the series of "multiple-agent 
qualitative-response" frameworks introduced into industrial organization literature to 
evaluate entry strategies and market competition.  Using a cross-section of markets as 
data, the econometrician infers the economic factors that contribute to the generation of 
the observed market structure.  Firms' strategies can be represented by discrete decisions 
(e.g., enter/do not enter a particular market) that are made by evaluating the potential 
alternatives.  Estimation is complicated by the fact that the decisions of competing firms 
may affect potential alternatives — for example, entry may be less attractive if other 
firms also have entered the market.  A game-theoretic behavioral model is used to infer 
the factors influencing individual firm decisions from an observed market structure 
outcome, which is determined by the choices made by interacting agents. 
 
IV.i  Entry Models Assuming Homogeneity 
Much of the industrial organization literature, as well as previous empirical papers on 
CLEC entry, have estimated straightforward limited dependent variable models of market 
structure.  The simplest of these analyses are probits that predict the likelihood of entry 
across markets; other studies estimate ordered probits with the number of firms as the 
dependent variable.  The market factors that determine entry are inferred from a profit 
function that underlies the entry decision, such as  
                                                           
13  Specifically, we use the unbundled network element (UNE) loop rate to proxy for the cost of 
interconnection, as this represents the bulk of network connection costs.  The CLECs may differ in the 
particular UNEs that they need from the incumbent; however, these differences are orthogonal to the 
product types that we are examining here. 
 
14 We also explored specifications for cross-sectional differences in the margins between regulated 
telephony prices and regulated costs, as estimated by Gregg (2002). We found that the estimate of margins 
and the estimate of interconnection rate were highly correlated, so we only included one in the final 
specification.  
  18m m m m m N Z X ε θ γ β π + − − =  
where m denotes the geographic market in question.  Markets may differ in the cross-
section in X-characteristics affecting demand for the firms' products or in Z-
characteristics that affect the firms' market-specific costs.  Nm represents the number of 
firms that have entered the market; θ indicates the extent to which additional market 
participants makes entry less attractive.  The εm term represents the components of firm 
profits that are unobserved to the econometrician.  
  The parameters of this function can be estimated using a cross-section of market 
structure observations.  For example, we may observe two firms operating in market m.  
This implies the following inequalities in market m: 
0 * ) 2 ( > + − − = m m m m Z X ε θ γ β π  
0 * ) 3 ( < + − − = m m m m Z X ε θ γ β π  
The parameters are determined by maximizing the likelihood that the inequalities implied 
by the observed market structures (assuming a distribution for the market level error 
term) hold. 
 
IV.ii  Extensions to Heterogeneous Markets 
  This approach can be extended to analyze firms in heterogeneous markets as well.  
Suppose that each market could have firms of two types, label them A and B.  Now, 
market structure is represented by an ordered pair (NA, NB) indicating the number of 
observed firms of each type.  In addition, there will be type-specific profit functions for 
these firms: 
Tm T Tm T Tm T m T m Tm N N Z X ε θ θ γ β π + − − − = − − , 
where  the cost and demand effects can be type-specific and where we can allow the 
effects of competitors to vary on the basis of whether they offer the same or different 
product types.  NTm indicates the number of same-type firms in the market, and N-Tm is the 
number of firms of the other type.  Therefore, the difference between the estimated θT 
and θ-T parameters captures the extent to which product differentiation may limit the 
effects of additional competitors on firm entry of each type.  The unobserved part of 
profits, εTm, is assumed to be different for each product type at a given market. 
  19  With multiple product types, the set of inequalities that corresponds to each 
market outcome is necessarily more complex.  A market observed with a structure of 
(A,B) implies that the following inequalities hold:  
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Again, we estimate the parameters by maximizing the likelihood that the inequalities 
corresponding to each observed outcome hold across the markets in the data set. (For 
further details, see Mazzeo’s 2002 study.) 
 
IV.iii   Identification and Testing 
Using cross-sectional differences in observed market structure, thisthe following 
approach identifies parameters describing the attractiveness of entry.. It is best suited for 
analysis of small and medium-sized cities, because with many firms the marginal effect 
of additional competitors is likely to be very small.  Consequently, we focus on 
measuring the key differences between cities that may become substantially more 
competitive with additional entry — places such as Buffalo, Little Rock, and Fresno. We 
believe that for policy purposes, these markets are most interesting; after all, larger cities 
will likely be competitive under almost any set of local and national regulations for 
CLECs (Woroch 2001).  
Intuitively speaking, identification of differentiation comes from comparing 
otherwise similar markets with different structures or, conversely, different markets with 
otherwise similar structures. Two markets with the same number of firms may not be 
otherwise equal — if the firms are more heterogeneous in one market, their 
differentiation may accompany a smaller population.  A particular market with 
insufficient demand to support two homogeneous firms may have enough demand for 
two firms that differentiate.  Recall that we conceptualize the function that underlies the 
market structure observations as a profit function, even though firms may have 
uncertainty about whether variable profits will exceed their costs of entry.  To the extent 
that markets are not in equilibrium at the times of our analysis, we are more precisely 
measuring firms’ expectations about profitability and how these expectations are affected 
by competition and differentiation.  We assume common perceptions about profitability 
  20and assume that any potential deviation between perceptions and subsequent realizations 
are not correlated across markets or product types. 
Finally, it is appropriate to think of our classification as a maintained assumption. 
The framework does not measure whether our classification of differentiation 
corresponds with success at executing the strategies identified in Table 1b, nor do we 
measure how highly users valued particular types of CLECs.  Our null hypothesis is that 
firms enter without regard to the product type of their competitors, using the business 
versus residential and local/regional versus national classifications from the previous 
section.  If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, we do so either because firms do not 
differentiate from their local competitors or because we have inappropriately classified 
the dimensions in which they differentiate.  Such a failure to reject could arise, for 
example, if differentiation between resale and facilities-based CLECs is actually what 
matters and it is orthogonal to the classifications we do analyze. If we reject the null 
hypothesis, then we accept the alternative hypothesis that CLECs enter local markets in 
such a way as to differentiate along the dimensions we classify. 
 
V.  Empirical Results 
To provide a comparison with earlier work, we begin our empirical analysis by 
estimating probits predicting CLEC entry and ordered probits whose dependent variables 
are the numbers of operating CLECs.  The explanatory variables highlight the 
foundations of scale-exceeding efficiencies — local market demand, geographic scope, 
and regulatory environment.  Unlike the previous analysis of CLEC entry, however, we 
examine city-level markets.
15  The finely grained data should yield insight about the 
precise relationship between local economic factors and entry levels. These estimates 
also provide a useful benchmark against our later estimates that account for 
differentiation. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results from two estimations — in the first the dependent 
variable is AOPERATE, a dummy variable that equals one if any CLECs are currently 
                                                           
15 As was previously mentioned, prior studies of CLEC entry used individual LATAs as the unit of 
observation.  Each LATA may contain several individual city markets, as defined in our data set. 
 
  21operating within that market.
16  We also present an ordered probit estimation, where the 
dependent variable OPERATE is a count of the number of CLECs doing business in the 
market.   
Table 7:  Probit of CLEC Entry — Dependent Variable = AOPERATE 
  Small/Medium Sized Cities  All Cities 
  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z 
Constant  –0.635 0.316 –2.01 –0.627 0.316 –1.98 
Population  3.29e-6 1.48e-6  2.23  3.31e-6 1.48e-6  2.24 
Payroll  3.17e-7 1.13e-7  2.81  3.23e-7 1.13e-7  2.85 
Per Capita 
Income 
2.56e-5 1.54e-5  1.67  2.55e-5 1.54e-5  1.66 
City in Top-
10 MSA 
0.254 0.168 1.51  0.250 0.168 1.48 
Incumbent  
= RBOC 
0.288 0.126 2.30  0.283 0.125 2.26 
Regulatory 
Stringency 




–0.033 0.010 –3.43 –0.033 0.010 –3.44 
Note: For an easier comparison with the following analysis, cities with seven or more operating CLECs 
were excluded from the left-hand panel.  There are 675 observations, with 718 in the full data set of cities. 
 
All three demographic variables are positively correlated with CLEC entry, with 
population and payroll being particularly significant.  Entry is positively affected by both 
the demand generated by consumers that live in the city and by businesses that operate 
within the city.  Interestingly, these two variables have somewhat greater predictive value 
in the OPERATE ordered probit.  This suggests that AOPERATE is a relatively coarse 
measure, at least as far as approximating CLEC demand. We also see that the city in a 
top-10 MSA dummy is positive in both estimations, but more significant in the 
AOPERATE probit.  There appears to be some (albeit weak) evidence of scope 
                                                           
16 Our set of markets that have zero operating firms, by construction, have at least one CLEC that is 
planning to enter.  This method of sample construction results in a wide array of cities – many with 
populations under 50,000 and some in otherwise low-density rural areas. Still, this is a fully random 
sample in the exogenous variables, so this method will bias the coefficients in Table 7 slightly downward, 
as compared to a sample that also includes even tinier cities in which  no CLECs had plans to enter.  
 
  22economies, since CLEC entry is more common in small and medium-sized cities within 
larger MSAs, all else being equal. 
The regulatory variables RBOC, regulatory stringency and interconnection rate are 
all significant and have the expected sign.  It appears easier for CLECs to enter in areas 
where RBOCs are the incumbent local service providers; this is consistent with the 
prediction that the regulatory incentives would make areas with RBOCs less hostile 
toward potential entrants.
17  The CLECs are also more common in areas where the 
regulators had experimented away from traditional rate-of-return systems for longer 
periods of time and where interconnection rates are set lower.  These results suggest that 
the regulatory environment can have both a long- and short-term effect on markets. 
 
Table 8: Ordered Probit of CLEC Firm Counts — Dependent Variable = OPERATE 
  Small/Medium Sized Cities  All Cities 
  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z 
Population  4.40e-6 7.75e-7 5.68  1.65e-6 5.23e-7 3.15 
Payroll  1.55e-7 4.79e-8 3.24  2.08e-7 3.29e-8 6.32 
Per Capita 
Income 
1.70e-5 9.55e-6 1.78  1.40e-5 9.22e-6 1.52 
City in Top-
10 MSA 
0.138 0.117  1.18 0.059 0.112  0.53 
Incumbent  
= RBOC 
0.206 0.102  2.02 0.253 0.098  2.58 
Regulatory 
Stringency 




-0.029 0.008  -3.56  -0.035 0.008  -4.35 
Note: For an easier comparison with the following analysis, cities with seven or more operating CLECs 
were excluded from the left-hand panel. There are 675 observations, with 718 in the full data set of cities. 
 
                                                           
17 We also tried dummy variables for individual RBOCs; however, when averaged over all the cities where 
the incumbents operate, the effect of individual RBOCs could not be distinguished from their aggregate 
impact relative to non-RBOC incumbents. 
 
  23V.i  Product Heterogeneity Estimates 
  In the heterogeneous products analysis, we allow for up to three firms of each 
product type in the market — therefore, the endogenous market structure variable can 
take on one of sixteen possible values. The information in Tables 3 and 4 capture the 
variation in the dependent variable across all the markets in the data set.
18  For each firm 
type and market configuration, a set of dummy variables is defined, and the 
corresponding θ-parameters represent the incremental effects of additional competitors 
on the profits of firms in the market. For example, in the comparison between the 
business-only and some-residential CLECs, we have 
19 
θRR1 = effect of first some-residential competitor on some-residential CLECs, 
θRR2 = effect of second some-residential competitor on some-residential CLECs, 
θRB = effect of business-only competitors on some-residential CLECs, 
θBB1 = effect of first business-only competitor on business-only CLECs, 
θBB2 = effect of second business-only competitor on business-only CLECs, and 
θBR = effect of some-residential competitors on business-only CLECs. 
The estimated parameters can be used to evaluate the null hypothesis of homogeneous 
competition. A strict test of that property is |θRR1| = |θRB| and |θBB1| = |θBR|.  We can reject 
the null in favor of a model of differentiated competition if we find |θRR1| > |θRB| and |θBB1| 
> |θBR|.  There are similar tests for homogeneity and differentiation with respect to the 
national versus local/regional classifications. Notice that in the absence of within-type 
heterogeneity, we would expect to find |θRR1| > |θRR2| and |θBB1| > |θBB2|.   
As in the probit estimations, the appropriate X-variables to include are either 
correlated with CLEC demand or entry costs in each market.  
  The specification also 
allows the effects associated with the X-variables to vary by product type. To ease 
estimation, the data for the X-variables are transformed to the log of the actual value for 
                                                           
18 For example, there are eleven markets whose dependent variable is (2,1) in the geographical ambition 
model — two local operating CLECs and one national operating CLEC (cf. Table 3).  Cities with more 
than three firms in either category are treated as if they have exactly three in that category. 
 
19 The goal is to make the specification of the competitive effects as flexible as possible, while maintaining 
estimation feasibility.  More flexible parameterizations of these effects did not yield further economic 
distinctions. 
 
  24that market divided by the sample mean of that X-variable across all the markets in the 
data set.  Consequently, a value of X equal to the sample mean becomes  zero, a value 
above the mean becomes positive and a value below the mean becomes negative.
20  This 
also eases interpretation because it puts all variables on the same scale and allows for a 
quick comparison of the economic importance of competing variables. For example, we 
can say that differentiation is “economically important” if it is as large as the variance in 
other exogenous variables, such as city size and income, which are known to shape the 
number of overall entrants. 
We present the results from the heterogeneous products analysis below, with the 
local/regional versus national classification in Table 9 and residential versus business 
classification in Table 10.  In each table, the estimated parameters indicate the impact on 
entry of each type of CLEC depending on market conditions and the competitors they 
face.  For example, the relative value of the constants indicates the relative baseline 
attractiveness of entry for each type.  Table 9 indicates that, all else being equal, a 
national CLEC would be more likely to enter before a local/regional CLEC, since CN = 
0.8695 > CL = 0.4961.
21 The advantage is less clear in Table 10, where the constant for 
some-residential,  CR = 0.2466, is only slightly greater than that for business-only, 
namely, CB = 0.1463. 
    Factoring in market conditions can change this relationship.  For example, 
consider the payroll variable — the parameter estimate for both product types is positive, 
indicating that greater business activity attracts CLECs of either type.  However, the 
estimated parameter is higher for the national CLEC than that for the local/regional 
CLEC.  This indicates that as the payroll in a city increases, the relative attractiveness of 
entry for national CLECs increases as well.  To illustrate how this can change market 
structure, suppose that in market m, payroll is half the sample mean, city in a top-10 
MSA, RBOC and regulatory stringency are set to zero, and the other X-variables are at 
                                                           
20 The transformation is done solely to facilitate estimation of the model.  The estimation routine converges 
more easily if the ranges of the independent variables are similar to each other.  
 
21 All the figures presented in this section represent predicted values.  The comparisons between product 
types assume that values of the unobservables for both types are at their mean — zero.  Directly evaluating 
the probability that one type’s entry is more likely than the other’s requires the standard errors of the 
parameters, as well as an assumption about the variance of the errors for each type. 
  25their sample means.  With no competitors, operating a local/regional CLEC is now more 
attractive [πL = 0.4961 + (-0.693) *(0.2430) = 0.328] than a national CLEC [πN = 0.8695 
+ (–0.693)*(0.8943) = 0.250].
22  This combination helps explain why the one-CLEC 
markets in the data set are more skewed toward local/regional CLECs (see Table 3) — 
small cities have less business activity and their lower business activity offsets the 
relative value of the constants. 
The key result in the two tables comes from the estimated competitive effects on 
CLEC type, as captured by the θ-parameters. The estimates indicate that the effects of 
competitors come predominately from same-type CLECs.  In Table 9, we observe that  
the presence of a similar competitor makes entry quite unattractive (θLL1 = -–1.18; θNN1 = 
–0.81).  as compared to the presence of competitors of the other product type (θLN = -
0.00; θNL = -0.06).  The estimates are similar in Table 10 for the some-residential CLECs 
(θRR1 = –1.17; θRB = –0.00), though not quite as strong for the business-only firms (θBB1 = 
–1.24; θBR = –1.12). This comparison accords with economic intuition. Recall that the 
classification scheme here is between CLECs that are targeted just to businesses 
(business-only) and CLECs that serve residential customers as well as businesses (some-
residential).  By construction, firms are targeting overlapping customer bases. Hence, it is 
not surprising that some-residential CLECs have a measurable competitive effect on the 
business-only firms.
23 In contrast, national firms target customers that differ from the 
local firms, so each type of firm pursues strategies more distinct from each other. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
22 With payroll half the sample mean, the parameter estimate for income is multiplied by ln(0.5) = (-0.693), 
to compute the prediction.  The transformed value of an X-variable at its sample mean is zero; therefore, 
the other variables do not contribute to the prediction. 
 
23 The customer overlap is not symmetric, as the presence of business-only competitors does not have an 
effect on the some-residential CLECs.  This may be because a business-only CLEC is not a relevant 
alternative for part of the some-residential CLEC’s customer base, whereas the some-residential CLEC 
would potentially be an alternative for all of a business-only CLEC’s customers. 
  26Table 9 — Profit Function Estimates from Two-Type Product Choice Model 
"National" and "Local/Regional" CLECs 
Parameter Estimate Standard  Error
Effect on Local/Regional CLECs 
Constant  CL  0.4961* 0.1385 
Local/Regional Competitor #1  θLL1  –1.1809* 0.1010 
Local/Regional Competitor #2  θLL2  –0.8523* 0.1141 
# of National Competitors  θLN  –0.0001 0.0043 
Population  βL-POP  0.0518* 0.0110 
Payroll  βL-PAY  0.2430* 0.0456 
Per-Capita Income  βL-INC  –0.3306 0.2802 
City in a Top-10 MSA  βL-MSA  –0.3192 0.2228 
Incumbent = RBOC  βL-RBOC  –0.3340* 0.1489 
Regulatory Stringency  βL-REGEXP  0.0139 0.1127 
Interconnection Rate  βL-LOOPRATE  –0.9084* 0.3208 
Effect on National CLECs 
Constant  CN  0.8695* 0.1910 
National Competitor #1  θNN1  –0.8062* 0.0744 
National Competitor #2  θNN2  –0.9518* 0.0965 
# of Local/Regional Competitors  θNL  –0.0642* 0.0054 
Population  βN-POP  –0.0338* 0.0047 
Payroll  βN-PAY  0.8943* 0.1205 
Per Capita Income  βN-INC  –1.0413* 0.3416 
City in a Top-10 MSA  βN-MSA  0.7591* 0.2434 
Incumbent = RBOC  βN-RBOC  –0.7921* 0.2000 
Regulatory Stringency  βN-REGEXP  –0.6350* 0.1673 
Interconnection Rate  βN-LOOPRATE  –0.0618 0.4445 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
These results provide strong evidence that CLECs enter markets in a pattern 
consistent with substantial returns to product differentiation — customer-targeted 
differentiation appears to insulate CLECs from lower margins that typically result form 
reduced competition in homogeneous product markets.    While the differences across 
product types is generally quite stark, substantial heterogeneity within types likely 
remains.  The effect of additional same-type competitors is about the same as the effect 
of the first same-type competitor.  Remaining differences within product types is 
consistent with lower prospects for entrants that face competition, but not low enough to 
deter entry entirely. 
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Table 10 — Profit Function Estimates from Two-Type Product Choice Model 
"Some-Residential" and "Business-Only" CLECs 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard  Error
Effect on Some-Residential CLECs 
Constant  CR  0.2466* 0.1046 
Some-Residential Competitor #1  θRR1  –1.1676* 0.1113 
Some-Residential Competitor #2  θRR2  –1.7414* 0.2179 
# of Business-Only Competitors  θRB  –0.0000 0.0000 
Population  βR-POP  0.0541* 0.0107 
Payroll  βR-PAY  0.1794* 0.0426 
Per Capita Income  βR-INC  0.7306* 0.2325 
City in a Top-10 MSA  βR-MSA  0.5561* 0.2051 
Incumbent = RBOC  βR-RBOC  –0.0003 0.0015 
Regulatory Stringency  βR-REGEXP  0.0029 0.0034 
Interconnection Rate  βR-LOOPRATE  –0.9246* 0.3096 
Effect on Business-Only CLECs 
Constant  CB  0.1463* 0.1055 
Business-Only Competitor #1  θBB1  –1.2443* 0.0799 
Business-Only Competitor #2  θBB2  –1.1097* 0.1125 
# of Some-Residential Competitors θBR  –1.1234* 0.0944 
Population  βB-POP  0.0377* 0.0102 
Payroll  βB-PAY  0.3606* 0.0625 
Per Capita Income  βB-INC  0.1280 0.2280 
City in a Top-10 MSA  βB-MSA  –0.1156 0.2230 
Incumbent = RBOC  βB-RBOC  –0.0893 0.0999 
Regulatory Stringency  βB-REGEXP  0.0977 0.1080 
Interconnection Rate  βB-LOOPRATE  –1.0268* 0.3381 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Comparing the β-parameters between the upper and lower panels of the two Tables 
illustrates how certain demographic variables and market conditions support one CLEC 
type more or less than the other.  As illustration, consider the market demand hypothesis 
that was evaluated using the per capita income variable.  The probit estimates indicates 
that cities with higher per capita income were more attractive for entry; the differentiated 
products analysis in Table 9 suggests that the some-residential CLECs find entry in such 
areas relatively more attractive (βR-INC = 0.73) than the business-only CLECs (βB-INC = 
0.13).  The effect of the regulatory environment can also differ by product type, as the 
  28local/regional CLECs get a positive boost in areas where the regulators have set lower 
interconnection rates (βL-LOOPRATE = –0.91).  The national CLECs appear to have entry 
strategies that are largely independent of local cost conditions (βN-LOOPRATE = –0.06), 
which suggests that the incentive to build a wide geographic base of operations is more 
powerful that the effect of interconnection costs at individual markets.   
The differences in the βcoefficients provide further evidence of the merits of 
modeling differentiation. All the coefficients between national and regional/local CLECs 
are statistically different from each other, which indicates that the two types of firms are 
attracted to much different locations.  The same is not so for the coefficients on the 
estimates for business-only and some-residential CLECs. Some of the coefficients differ, 
principally  payroll, per capita income, and city in top-10 MSA. As with our earlier 
findings, this indicates that business-only and some-residential firms differ from each 
other, but not as much. For example, the interconnection rate has the same effect on both 
types. 
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that the differentiation strategies of 
CLECs up through 1999 precipitated entry in many local markets.  The estimated 
parameters are consistent with the notion that entry was more attractive for differentiated 
CLECs than for CLECs whose service offerings were homogenous, thereby explaining 
the market structure patterns displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Thus, we conclude that the 
diffusion of CLECs into local markets throughout the United States operated through 
economic forces beyond scale-exceeding efficiencies. We reject the hypothesis that 
CLECs entry behavior is consistent with the presence of homogenous product 
competition. Instead, we find strong evidence consistent with the presence of customer-
targeted differentiation. Also, the size of the parameter estimates suggests that the motive 
to differentiation is economically important. Finally, different types of CLECs display 
distinctly different degrees of sensitivity to certain local economic conditions and to the 
local regulatory environment. This suggests a strong role for policy-making in shaping 
the development of local telecommunications markets and the services provided by the 
CLECs that enter.  
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The empirical results presented here demonstrate a striking pattern of product 
differentiation among CLEC entrants through the late 1990s.  Whether measured on the 
basis of target customers or geographic scope, CLECs followed entry strategies that 
resulted in markets that are almost evenly split between product types, as opposed to 
dominated by firms of one type of another.  This pattern suggests that CLECs were 
concerned about competing with each other and that tailoring products to meet the needs 
of consumers was an important business strategy for them.  As such, we reject the 
hypothesis that deregulation was driven exclusively by the logic of scale-exceeding 
efficiencies. Instead, we argue that differentiated behavior shaped firm entry behavior as 
much as differences in local economic and regulatory conditions.  
We conclude that the literature on competitive local telephony should begin to 
investigate the many issues raised by this shift of views. The results demonstrate the role 
that product differentiation can play in expanding competition in previously regulated 
industries.  For a variety of reasons, it may be difficult for a monopolist to effectively 
serve all types of heterogeneous customers equally well.  By opening such markets up to 
competition, firms targeting underserved customers may enter — as they did for CLECs.   
Policy makers should account for consumer welfare gains that result from better 
product targeting as well as from lower prices. While all pro-competitive policies for 
local telephony support putting entrants through a market test, our results identify what 
ignoring differentiation can miss. Policy making should not presume it knows the 
formula for commercial success solely on the basis of observing ILECs and counting the 
number of incumbent CLECs. Instead policy should identify CLEC strategies that differ 
from those of the ILEC and other CLECs, with the intent of encouraging firms that let 
consumers choose among an expanded array of options. 
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